In short: The Zurich-based health promotion foundation Radix was hit by a ransomware attack on 16 June 2025. According to Radix, data was exfiltrated and various data was encrypted; the Sarcoma group published the stolen data on its leak site on 29 June 2025. The Federal Office for Cybersecurity (NCSC, German: BACS) confirmed that federal administration data is also affected, but that the attackers never had access to federal systems.
Key facts at a glance
- Date: Attack on 16 June 2025, data published on 29 June 2025 (source: Radix, notice of 30 June 2025)
- Affected organisation: Radix Foundation, a non-profit headquartered in Zurich whose eight competence centres carry out mandates for the Confederation, cantons, municipalities and private foundations (source: Radix)
- Attack type: Ransomware with data exfiltration and encryption (source: NCSC, 30 June 2025)
- Threat actor: Sarcoma published the data on its leak site (source: Radix, 30 June 2025)
- Confirmed impact: Data published on the darknet, including data of federal administrative units; which units and data were concretely affected was still being clarified at the time of the notice (source: NCSC)
- Federal systems: No access by the attackers, as Radix has no direct access to federal administration systems (source: NCSC)
- Data holdings: Radix holds all data undamaged on backups (source: Radix)
What is confirmed?
Radix states that it immediately revoked access to the affected data once the attack was detected. The foundation found that data had been exfiltrated, and various data had been encrypted. In its notice of 24 June 2025, Radix described the damage as significant based on what was known at the time, without stating an amount.
According to its own notice, Radix was in contact with the NCSC, the Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC), the Data Protection Commissioner of the Canton of Zurich and the Zurich city police. Affected individuals were informed personally where particularly sensitive personal data could be involved. As of 30 June 2025, Radix had no indication that sensitive data of partner organisations was affected.
On 30 June 2025, the NCSC reported that Radix’s clients include various federal administrative units. It coordinates the clarifications and measures within the federal administration and is in contact with Radix, law enforcement authorities and the affected administrative units.
On 24 June 2025, the Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH) stated that the anonymous online counselling services SafeZone (addiction questions) and Stopsmoking (quitting smoking), which Radix runs on behalf of the FOPH and the Tobacco Prevention Fund, were not directly affected because they are not hosted on Radix’s infrastructure. According to the FOPH, there was no indication that particularly sensitive data on these platforms was affected.
What is not known?
- Amount of damage: None of the sources gives a financial loss in Swiss francs.
- Ransom: Whether a ransom was demanded or paid, and how much, is not documented in the official statements.
- Volume of data: Neither Radix nor the NCSC states a data volume or the number of people affected.
- Initial access: According to Radix, how the attack was carried out was under investigation.
- Affected federal units: The NCSC announced further information “in due course”; the notice of 30 June 2025 contains no list of affected units.
- Business interruption and insurance: The sources say nothing about the duration of any disruption or about insurance cover.
What it means for cyber insurance
No promise of cover can be derived from the incident alone. The case does show that backups secure recovery but cannot prevent stolen data from being published. Depending on the policy, incident response and IT forensics, legal and data protection advice, costs of notifying affected individuals, data restoration, liability claims by clients or third parties, and crisis communication may be relevant modules. Whether and to what extent benefits apply depends in particular on the policy wording, sub-limits and exclusions, agreed security obligations and the specific claims process.
Lessons for Swiss SMEs
- Minimise client data: Store data from mandates only as long as necessary and agree a deletion policy with clients.
- Separate sensitive services: The FOPH counselling platforms show that systems outside the affected infrastructure were not directly affected. Critical applications belong in separate environments.
- Combine backups with exfiltration controls: Test offline or immutable backups regularly, and add access controls, encryption of data at rest and monitoring of large outbound transfers.
- Prepare a contact list: Decide in advance who must be informed in an emergency, such as the NCSC, the FDPIC, cantonal data protection authorities depending on the client, the police and affected customers.
- Warn about follow-up phishing: Radix advised particular vigilance against phishing in the months after the leak. This warning belongs in every communication to affected people.
- Review insurance specifically: Check whether liability towards clients, notification costs and data protection advice are included and which obligations apply.
Sources
- NCSC: Cyberattack on the Radix Foundation: federal administration data also affected (30 June 2025, German)
- FOPH: Information on the cyberattack on RADIX (24 June 2025, German)
- Radix: Information on the cyberattack, as of 30 June 2025 (PDF, German)
- Radix: Information on the cyberattack, as of 24 June 2025 (PDF, German)