Phishing: Private individual, Switzerland 2023
Without realising it, a victim entered their login data for the telephone provider’s customer portal on a phishing page.
- Incident · 05.2023 · Switzerland
- Evidence: confirmed by an authority
- Phishing
- Account takeover
As of
What happened
The attackers used it to order a new SIM or eSIM, after which the victim’s mobile phone could neither make calls nor receive text messages (SIM swapping). Because no more emails were arriving either, the victim noticed the attack early and had the attackers’ eSIM blocked.
- Affected
- Private individual (anonymous)
- Industry
- Private individual
- Loss
- no reliable figure
- Business interruption
- unknown
- Ransom demanded / paid
- unknown / unknown
- Data affected
- unknown
- Bankruptcy
- no
- Entry point
- Phishing link in the name of the telephone provider
What would cyber insurance have paid?
That depends on the terms. Whether those affected were insured: unknown.
-
Social media, email or shop taken over
Mostly no information 14 of 29 private products cover it fully, as an add-on or with limits.
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Orders and accounts in your name
Mostly limited 22 of 29 private products cover it fully, as an add-on or with limits.
Overview based on public policy terms, as of 06.11.2026. Only your policy and its general terms and conditions (GTC) are binding. No confirmation of cover.
What we can learn
If your mobile phone suddenly stops working despite reception, call the provider immediately: it may be SIM swapping.
Sources
- Wochenrückblick Woche 19: «SIM-Swapping» - wie eine SIM online gestohlen werden kann (opens in a new window) Bundesamt für Cybersicherheit BACS (bis 2023: NCSC) · 16.05.2023
«Das Opfer hat dank dem Ausbleiben der E-Mails den Angriff frühzeitig erkannt und konnte die eSIM der Angreifer deaktivieren lassen.»